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The European Community seems to be moving rapidly toward economic integra-
tion. Barrïers to trade ín goods and fínancial assets are to come down by
1992. However, the fate of the European Monetary System seems to be in some
doubt, especíally in light of the elimination of capital controls. Without
capital controls, the maintenance of fixed exchange rates may require conver-
gence in monetary policy and ínflation rates. Should the emergence of a single
European currency be part of the 1992 agenda? We would like to suggest a new
way of looking at this question.
Over the last fifteen years, arguments for fixed exchange rates have focused
on stabilization problems created by sticky prices or on inflation problems
caused by policymakers' lack of credibilityl Sticky prices were thought to
imply adjustment costs, and the case for fixed rates was analyzed along the
lines of Poole (1970) or along the game theoretic lines of Canzoneri and Gray
(1985). Alternatively, it was argued that "weak" policymakers could combat
inflationary expectations by tying their currencies to a more stable currency;
credíbility problems were analyzed along the lines of Barro and Gordon (1983).
In this paper however, we eschew all problems associated with sticky prices or
policymaker credibility, and assume that prices are market-determined and that
European policymakers cooperate with each other and are believed by the private
sector. We do not mean to suggest that these problems are irrelevant; we do
mean to focus attention on a neglected aspect in the determination of optimal
currency areas.
Our basic purpose here is to present a víew of optimal currency areas that
is based on the principles of public finance? The seignorage tax is one among
many distortionary taxes that can be imposed to raise revenue. As Table 1
shows, some countries raíse a substantial proportion of their revenue throughti
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seignorage while others raise very little. Why does Italy depend so heavily on
the seignorage tax, while Germany does not? The public finance literature
provides one answer. Tax rates should to be set to smooth out distortions.
Optimal tax rates will depend upon the menu of taxes a government can impose;
goods and services that are taxed in one region may be beyond the tax collec-
tors reach in another. Optimal tax rates wíll also depend upon the supply and
demand elasticíties of the goods taxed. There is no reason to think that the
optimal inflation tax in Germany will be the same as that in Italy. For that
matter, there is no reason for the optimal inflation tax in southern Italy to
be the same as that in northern Italy. In any case, the implications of the
prínciples of public finance seem clear. Regions that requíre the same
inflation tax may form an optímal currency area.
Since countries have different menus of taxes, and even within a single
country different regions may exhibit very dífferent supply and demand elasti-
cities, one might expect that the public finance view will call for many
different inflation taxes, dividíng the world into many small regions. As
Mundell (1961) has observed, this does not appeal to common sense. (Mundell
originated the stabilization view of optimal currency areas, but worried that
it would call for many small regions.) Nor does it accord with a long-held
view that trade in many currencies is intrinsically costly, so that currency
areas should be large. Mundell writes (p. 662):
...It will be recalled that the older economists of the nineteenth
century were ínternationalists and generally favored a world currency.
...Mill, like Bagehot and others, was concerned with the costs of
valuation and money-changing, not stabilization policy, and it is
readily seen that these costs tend to increase with the number of
currencies. Any given money qua numeraire or unit of account fulfílls
this function less adequately if the prices of foreign goods are
expressed ín terms of foreign currency and must then be translated into
domestíc currency prices. Similarly, money in its role of inedium of
exchange ís less useful if there are many currencies; although the3
costs of currency conversion are always present, they loom excep-
tionally large under inconvertibility or flexible exchange rates.
Similar notions have been expressed by those who favor a continuation of the
EMS or the creation of a single European currency, though the actual cost of
multiple currencies has never been measured3
Thus, we come to the factors we will consider in drawing the boundaries of
an optimal currency area4 Multiple currencies allow separate inflation rates
in each country or region, and this flexibility may well produce tax smoothing
efficiencies. However, these benefits must be weighed against the valuation
and currency conversion costs that are introduced by the multiplicity of
currencies.
To illustrate this tradeoff, we construct a two country model of what we
call the "EC". We give "Italy" tax smoothing reasons to opt for high infla-
tion; we model "Germany" as a low inflation country. From the public finance
point of view, the EC is not an optimal currency area. However, we also model
valuation and currency conversion costs, costs that can be eliminated if Italy
and Germany eschew their separate currencies and adopt a single European
curreucy, the "ECU". The EC is an optímal currency area if the costs of
multiple currencies outweigh the benefits of tax smoothing.
In section I, we outline our model of the EC. The model is essentially a
two country versíon of the model used by Lucas (1987) and Lucas and Stokey
(1987). Each country is populated by infinitely-lived households that consume
home cash goods, home credit goods and foreign credit goods; the cash good is
subject to a cash in advance constraint. Each country has a given level of
public spending that must be financed through seignorage or taxation. We model
only one asymmetry between the countries: Italy has a black market that cannot
be taxed directly, while Germany has no black market, and all German income isL
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subject to an income tax. The black market good is modeled as a"cash" good.
So, Ztaly can use inflation to tax its black economy indirectly5
The model comes in two versions. In the first, each country has its own
currency, and doing business with two currencies wastes resources. Each
country is endowed with labor that can be converted one for one into cash goods
or home credit goods; additional resources must be expended if the credit good
is sold to a foreigner. These costs reflect the time and effort it takes to
quote prices in a foreign currency and to convert the proceeds back into
domestic currency. In the second version of the model, Europe has only one
currency, and selling to a foreigner implies no additional costs.
In section II, we give a formal definition of the optimal currency area
problem. The EC policymaker's problem is to choose the number of currencies
and to set the available tax rates to maximize a weighted sum of the utilities
of Italian and German households.
In section III, we find the best outcome that can be achieved íf the two
currencies are retaíned. With two currencíes, the EC policymaker has enough
taxes to achieve an efficient outcome. The optimal tax rates have to make the
relative price of cash and credit goods iri each country equal to one, the rate
of transformation in production. In Italy, the inflation tax on cash goods
(the black economy) must balance the sales tax on credit goods. Germany's
income tax is not distortionary; however, the relative price of cash and credit
goods will be distorted if the German nominal interest rate is greater than
zero, since money must be held in lieu of bonds to purchasP a cash good. It
turns out that the optimal inflation rate is equal to minus the time rate of
preference, as Friedman has suggested. From a public finance poínt of view,
the EC is not an optímal currency area. Any EMS constraint that makes Italían5
and Germar. inflation rates converge must decrease welfare in one country or the
other.
The relevance of our way of modeling the tax smoothíng problem depends upon
the importance of the black market in Italy. Table 2 presents estimates of the
relative size of the black economy in various countries; the estímates vary
widely, but Italy's black economy appears to be two or three times the size of
black economies in other European countries. One might conclude that Italy
does indeed have more reason to resort to the inflation tax. Of course, we do
not mean to suggest that the black economy is Italy's only reason for running a
high inflation rate. Italy could differ from Germany in a number of ways that,
according to the principles of public finance, ought to result in a higher
inflation rate.
In section IV, we ask if the EC policymaker could do better by introducing a
European currency. By adoptíng a common currency, Italy and Germany could
eliminate the valuation and currency conversion costs associated with multiple
currencies, but they could no longer run the independent inflation rates they
need for optimal tax smoothing. The answer we obtain should be obvious. If
government spending ís high, then a lot of revenu.. must be raised, and the
benefits of optimal tax smoothing outweigh the extra costs associated with
multiple currencies. The EC is not an optímal currency area. On the other
hand, if the required revenues are more modest, then the EC can be an optimal
currency area.
The complexity of our model finally drove us to use simulations to obtain
the answer we have just given, but our investment in simulations did pay some
empirical dividends. The valuation and currency conversion costs we descríbe
must be rather small, and one might wonder whether the tradeoff we analyze is a6
real concern. In our model, which is admittedly stylized and símple, we find
that very small costs imply the EC ís an optimal currency area.
Finally, ín section V, we describe limitations of our analysis. We also
make suggestions for future research.
I. A Simple Model of the EC
The model comes in two versions. In one version, each country has its own
currency, while in the other, Europe has a single currency. We begin with the
multíple currency version, and then explain how it has to be modified to get
the single currency version.
There are only two countries in our stylized model of the EC: Italy and
Germany. Italy is inhabited by identical, infinitely-lived households whose
utility depends upon consurnption of an Italian cash good, x, an Italian credit
good, y, and a German credit good, z:
m r 1 ~t (1) U-
Et-OL1 f b u(xt~yt~zt).
Similarly, Germany is populated by identical, infinitely lived households whose
u~ility depends on consumption of a German cash good, xk, a German credit good,
yk, and an Italian credit good, zk:
~ ~ ~ 1 t ~ ~ ~
(1) U-~t-0 1 f b] u(xt~Yt~zt).
~'s denote German variables. Cash goods must be bought with cash, while credit
goods are invoiced for payment later. We have modeled the foreign goods as7
credit goods; so, we are thinkíng of a German's purchase of a Fiat, and not her
vacation on the Italian Riviera.
Households are endowed with n units of labor each period. This labor can be
converted one for one into home cash goods or home credit goods. If Italy and
Germany have separate currencies, then producers incur extra resource costs
when they sell to foreigners: c~ 1 units of labor are needed to produce one
credít good sold to a foreigner. If the EC adopts a single currency, then c~l.
Thus, the resource constraints for Italy and Germany are
~
(2) xt f yt f czt f g- n and
~ ~ ~ ~
xt f yt f czt f g - n .
g and g~ are exogenously-determíned rates of government spending in Italy and
Germany.
The cash in advance framework and the distinction between cash goods and
credit goods are borrowed from Lucasó Each period begins with a financial
exchange and ends with a goods market. In the financial exchange, households
pay for the credit goods they purchased last period and acquire the cash they
will need in the goods market that follows; governments collect taxes, pay
interest on debt and issue new debt (in the form of money or bonds). In the
goods market, households dívide into worker-shopper pairs. Workers produce
cash goods and credit goods; shoppers vísit the workers of other households and
buy goods. Shoppers must pay cash for the cash goods; credit goods are
invoiced in the shopper's currency for payment in the next financial exchange.
Between periods, households store the cash they received for the cash goods
their workers produced. These cash balances are the base for the inflation
tax.8
Now we can be more explícit about the extra costs workers incur when there
are multiple currencies. Credit goods are, by assumption, invoiced in the
buyer's currency, and in the next period the payment for them comes in the
buyer's currency~ A worker incurs two additional costs in selling credit
goods to a foreigner. First, the worker has to value the good in another unit
of account. Second, the foreign currency received must be converted ínto
domestic currency, so that the household can purchase domestic cash goods.
Both of these acti~ities take time and effort, so we have modeled them as
direct resource costs. They are our model's incarnation of the valuation costs
and the brokerage fees described by Mundell and others.
Certain arbitrage conditíons are immediate, and it will facilitate our
discussion to take advantage of them. A worker will charge the same price for
cash goods and home credit goods, since each takes one unit of labor to produce
and the sale of either results in cash that cannot be used until the next
financial period. Let pt be the lira price of the Italian goods, and let pt be
the mark price of the German goods. What price will a worker charge a foreign
shopper for a credit good? It takes c units of labor to produce a credít good
for a foreigner, and the worker wants sales to all customers to result in the
same cash value in the next financial exchange; so, letting et be the lira
price of marks,
(3) pt - etflpt c
~
and Pt - iPt,etfl~c
are the prices charged to Italian and German shoppers for foreign credit goods.9
An Italian household's budget constraínt for the financial exchange ís
(4) mt } bIt } etbGt f BtPt(Yt f qtzt) G
~
Rt-1bIt-1 } etRt-lbGt-1 } pt-1(n - yt-1 - qt-lZt-1)
On the left hand side, we have the household's acquisition of money and bonds
and its tax payments. "I" subscripts denote Italian government bonds, which
pay the gross nominal return R, and "G" subscripts denote German government
bonds, which pay R~. The Italian government levíes a sales tax, Bt, on the
household's purchases of domestic and foreígn credit goods; qt (~ pt,pt) is the
relative price of the foreign credit good. The black economy is embodied in
the Italian cash good; market transactions go unrecorded and untaxed. On the
right hand síde, we have the gross return on bonds purchased last period, plus
receipts from last period's sales, minus payments for credit goods invoiced
last period.
German households face a similar budget constraint:
~ w s ~ ~r ~
(4~ mt } bit,et } bGt ~ Ttptn s
~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ ~ s
Rt-1bIt-l,et } Rt-1bGt-1 } pt-l~n - Yt-1 - qt-lZt-1~'
Z~
Q~ (~ pt ~pt) is the relative price of foreign credit goods; note that q-
t
c2~qt. The only difference between (4) and ( 4k) is the tax structure. There
is no black economy in Germany. The German government levies a tax, rt, on all
German labor income.
In these household constraints, we have assumed that the cash in advance10
constraints were binding in the previous period; that is,
~ ~ ~
(S) mt - ptxt and mt - ptxt.
If Rt and Rt are greater than one, then money is a dominated asset, and the
constraints will indeed be binding. In one of the equilibria we derive, Rt is
equal to one, and German investors are indifferent between holding money and
bonds; in this case, we assume (without loss of generality) that (S) still
holds and savings go into bonds.
Households maximize utility subject to budget constraints. Their first
order conditions are
au~ay
(6) t - Rtl f Bt~
au,axt
au~azt
-1 - qt(Rt t Bt).
au~axt
pt (1 f ó) - Rt ,
au~axttl
pttl





au~axt - qtRt ~
au~axt
~ ~




Marginal rates of substitution are set equal to relative prices.
Governments also face budget constraints in the financial exchange:
~
(~) Rt-1(bIt-1 } bIt-1) } pt-1(g - T) c bIt f bIt f mt -
mt-1 } Btpt(yt } qtzt)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Rt-1(bGt-1 } bGt-1) } pt-1(g } qt-1T) ~ bGt } bGt } mt - mt-1 }'tptnt.
On the left hand síde of each of these constraints, the first term is principal11
plus interest on the debt, while the second ís a settling of last períod's
credit transactions. T is a transfer from the German government to the Italian
government; we will consider combined EC policies that make such transfers
possible. Governments are credit customers; g and g~ are bought on credit. We
also assume that intergovernmental transfers are credits that are settled in
the next financial exchange8 On the right hand síde of the constraints, the
first terms are new debt issue, and the last is tax proceeds.
We let ht and ht be the growth rates of the two monies, defined in a rather
peculiar way,
~ ~ ~ ~
(8) ht - (mt - mt-1),mt and ht ~ (mt -
mt-1)~mt'
Seignorage collections can be expressed as
~ ~ ~ ~
(9) mt - mt-1 - htmt and mt -
mt-1 - htmt,
~
so, ht and ht may be viewed as seignorage tax rates.
In this paper, we only consider stationary equilibria9 A number of results
for stationary equilibria follow immediately from the arbitrage conditions,
(3), the cash in advance constraints, (S), and the first order condítions, (6):
(10) Rtl(1 f ó - m
) t~mttl - 1- httl'
R~-1(1 f ó) - mt~mtfl
- 1- htfl'




etfl - (1 - xt)~(1 - ~t), et ~ (et - et-1),et'12
These results are standard. Inflation rates are equal to money growth rates,
which in a stationary equilibrium can also be viewed as seignorage tax rates.
The rate of depreciation is approximately equal to the difference in inflation
rates, and nominal interest rates increase with money growth rates.
In a stationary equilibrium, the first order conditions become
au~ay - 1 - h (11) au~ax 1 f s} e'
auaz -qrl -h 1
au~ax Ll f S} BJ '
aulay~ - 1 - h~ au az~ ~(1 - h~ and L
au~ax~ 1 t b au~ax~ - q 1 t d '
The household budget constraints become
(12) x f B(y f qz) -(1 - h)(n - y- qz)
~t ~ ~t
- (1 - h~) (n~t
~ ~z~ x f r n - y - q )~
and the government budget constraints becomel0
(13) (1 - h)(g - T) - B(y f qz) f hx and (1 - h~)(g~t q~T) - r~n~ t h~x~
In addition, there is no borrowing or lending, so trade balances must equal the
intergovernmental transfer. For example, the Italian trade deficit, in units
of the Italian cash good, is equal toll13
(14) qz - cz~ - T.
The EC policymaker's constraint is found by aggregating the Italian and
German government budget constraints:
(15) g f g~rq~ - ~B(y } qz) f hx~I(1 - h) f(r~n~ f h~x~)Iq~(1 - h~).
T, the intergovernmental transfer, is now implicit. Finally, it should be
noted that not all of these budget constraints are independent; using the
resource constraints and the trade deficit equation, the household budget
constraints, (12), ímply the EC policymaker's constraint, (15).
Summarizing, a s-tationarv eQUilibrium ín the two currencv version of the
model is defined by the two resource constraints, (2), the four first order
conditions, (11), and the two household budget constraints, (12). If an
equilibrium exists, the variables x, y, z, x~, y~, z~, q, and the tax rates h,
B, h~, r~ must satisfy these eight equations.
Three modifícations must be made in the model íf Europe adopts a single
currency, the ECU. First, the resource costs associated with multiple curren-
cies are eliminated, so c- 1. Second, a single quantity equation, denominated
in ECU's and reflecting both countries' cash in advance constraints, is used to
calculate inflation. And finally, we have to explain what is done with the
seignorage proceeds.
We now go through the model, equatíon by equation, explaining the required
modifications. The utílity functions, (1), are unchanged. The c's drop out of
the resource constraints, (2). The c's and the e's drop out of (3), and q-
t14
lrqt; pt is the ECU price of the Italian good and pt is the ECU price of the
German good. The e's drop out of the household budget constraints, (4), The
first order conditions, (6), are the same, with of course Rt equal to Rt.
The cash in advance constraints, (S), reduce to one equation,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(16) mt - ptxt } ptxt - pt(xt } qtxt) - Pt(xt~qt f xt),
where mt is the supply of ECU's.
In a stationary equilibrium,
(17) ~ - ~~ ~ H~
where H is the growth rate of ECU's. The household first order conditions,
(11), become
(18) 8u~av ~ 1- H~ B 8u,8x 1 f b '
8u~8z 1 - H
eu~8y s q 1 f b}
~ au~ay 1- H au~aZ~ ~rl - Hl
óu~8x~ i 1 t ó
and
8u 8 ~ a q ll f bJ
~ y
The household budget constraints, (12), become
(19) x f B(y f qz) -(1 - H)(n - y- qZ)
~ ~ ~
x f r n -( 1 - H)(n~ - y~ - z~rq)~15
and the EC policymaker's constraint, (15), is replaced by
(2C) (1 - H)(g } qg~) - B(Y } qz) t qr~n~ t H(x f qx~)~
Once again, the policyrnaker's budget constraint ís redundant; using the
resource constraints, it can be derived from the household budget constraints.
Summarizing, a stationarv evuilibrium in the single currency version of the
model is defined by the two resource constraints, (2), the four first order
conditions, (18), and the two budget constraints, (19). If an equilibrium
exists, the variables x, y, z, x~, y~, z~, q, and the tax rates H, B, and r~
must satisfy these eight equations.
II. The Optimal Currency Area Problem
The levels of government spending (g and g~) are fixed; the only question is
how to fínance them. The seignorage tax and Italy's tax on credit goods are
distortionary. Germany's income tax would have been distortionary if we had
modeled a labor-leísure decision. If the EC keeps the two currencies, then
there are four tax rates (h, h~, 8 and r~) to be set. Having four separate
taxes helps in smoothing the tax distortions, but the multiplicíty of curren-
cies imposes extra costs on producers who sell abroad. If the EC adopts a
single currency, then the extra costs disappear, but there are only three taxes
(H, B, and ~~) available for tax smoothing. The EC will be an optimal currency
area if the valuation and currency conversion costs are more important than tax
smoothing.
To be more precise, we assume that the EC policymaker chooses the number of
currencies and the rates of the available taxes to maximize a weighted sum of16
the utilities of Italian and German households. First, we calculate the best
that can be done if two currencies are retaíned; that is, we solve the problem
(21) max W s wU f(1 - w)U~
{x,y,z,x~,y~,z~,q,h,h~,B,T~}
subject to the conditions that define equilibrium
in the two currency version of the model.
Then, we calculate the best that can be done if a single currency ís adopted;
that is, we solve the problem
(22) max W~ wU t(1 - w)Ux
{x,y,Z,x~,y~,Z~,q,H,e,T~}
subject to the conditions that define equilibrium
in the one currency version of the model.
Finally, we compare the results to determine the conditions under which the EC
is an optimal currency area.
III. Tax Smoothing with Two Currencies
For simplicity, we wi11 now let n equal n~ and g equal g~. The Italían
black market is the only asyinmetry between the two countries. Proposition 1
gives the best that can be done if the two currencies are retained:
Proposition 1: The solution to problem (21) (with w-.5) is defined by
au~ay - au~a~ au~az~ au~az ~
,~ - 1~ - ~- c, h-- b t B(1 f b), h- - b, au~ax au~ax au~ax au~ax
the resource constraints, and the household budget constraints. If we
let u(x,y,z) - ln x t ln y f ln z, then we obtain the solution:17
x-y-x~-y~- ín - g)r3, z- z~- (n - g)r3c,
B-- (1 f ó)g f(1~3)é(n - g) ~ S r 2ól fgl
(1 f ó)g f (1~3) (ó f 3) (n - g) , ~ - 3 f I 1 f
3J LnJ
~ h-- ó f B(1 -~ ó), h-- é and U- U~ - 31n(n 3g) - ln(c).
Proposition 1 can be verified directly, by actually doíng the maximization.
This is a rather messy exercise. Here, we give a heuristic argument that we
think sheds more light on the solutíon. (An appendix with a formal proof of
Proposition 1 is available upon request.)
An efficient outcome for the EC would solve the planner's problem:
(23) max W ~ .SU f .SU~
tx,y,z,x~,y~,z~~
subject to the resource constraints, (2).
An economic planner is a hypothetical díctator who, unlike the real EC policy-
maker, can simply allocate labor and consumption without going through markets
(or worryíng about cash in advance constraints). We want to show that the
allocation specified in Proposition 1 is the solution to the planner's problem,
and that it can be achieved by the EC policymaker with an appropriate choice of
tax rates.
In an efficient solution, marginal rates of substitution in consumption inust
equal marginal rates of transformation in production, and íf the efficient
solution is to be supported by a market economy, after tax relative prices must
reflect these optimal tradeoffs. There are two margins to consider: the margin
between cash goods and home credit goods, and the margin between cash goods and18
credit goods sold to foreigners.
First, consider the margin between cash goods and home credit goods. Since
one unit of labor will produce either a cash good or a home credit good, the
marginal rate of substitution between these goods must equal one. That is what
is asserted in the first set of equations in Proposition 1.
The tax rates that achieve this relative price can be deduced from the first
order conditions (6) or (11). R~, the gross rate of return on German bonds,
must be equal to one to avoid distortions between the German cash and credit
goods; a consumer has to hold cash instead of bonds to buy a cash good, but
this causes no distortion if money and bonds bring the same return. To make R~
equal one, the German seignorage tax must be set in accordance wíth Friedman's
rule; that is, h~ must be equal to -S, the German rate of time preference. In
Italy, the story is a little more complícated. The tax on credit goods can
also cause a dístortion between cash and credit goods; B and h must be set so
that
(24) R-1 } B~ 1 f ó} B- 1.
In Italy, the seignorage tax on cash goods must balance the sales tax on credit
goods, so that the relative price is unaffected.
Next, consider the margin between cash goods and credit goods sold to
foreigners, c units of labor must be expended on a credit good sold abroad;
so, the marginal rate of substitution (in the planner's welfare function)
between cash goods and credit goods consumed abroad must equal c. That is what
is asserted by the second set of equatíons in Proposition 1(when w-.5).
Of course, the taxes must also produce enough revenue to finance g and g~;19
the taxes must be consistent with the budget constraints. As explained in
section I, we have taken the household budget constraints, (12), to be the
independent constraints. However, substituting the resource constraínts, (2),
into the household constraints, and using (14), we recover the individual
government budget constraints, (13). Moreover, there is no intergovernmental
transfer ín this solution12 so, taxes must satisfy the individual government
constraints with T equal to zero. Setting x, y, z, x~, y~, z~, q and q~ equal
to their equilibrium values, and recalling (23) and the requirement that h~ be
equal to -ó, we obtain the tax rates specifíed in Proposition 1.
In summary, Proposition 1 asserts that the EC policymaker has enough tax
instruments to achieve an efficient outcome. Some of the taxes are distortion-
ary, but with enough taxes, the distortions can be balanced to achíeve effi-
cient market prices.
Optimal tax smoothing requires different rates of inflation in Germany and
Italy. In Germany, the optimal inflation rate is negative and equal to minus
the rate of time preference. In Italy, the optimal inflation rate depends on
the arnount of government spending. It is negative when g- 0, but rises with
g, and becomes positive for a large enough g. The Italian inflation rate may
thus be either positive or negative: however, it is always greater than the
German inflation rate.
Since Italian inflation must be greater than German inflation, this solution
requíres a continuous deprecíation of the lira. From (10), ê-~-~~ - h- hk
-(1 f ó)B. Any attempt to limit this depreciation would be counterproductive.
Tax distortions would be introduced, and welfare would be lower in one or both
countries.20
IV. When is the EC an Optimal Currency Area7
If the EC were to rule out depreciations altogether, or equivalently if the
EC were to adopt a síngle currency, the ECU, then valuation costs and currency
conversion costs would be mitigated or even elíminated. In our model, these
costs are eliminated, and c reverts to unity. However, with only one currency,
there would be only one inflation rate, and one less tax rate for the EC
policymaker to set. It turns out that there are too few taxes to eliminate the
tax distortions entirely in the ECU version of the model. However, the costs
associated with multiple currencies may make the EC an optimal currency area,
even though tax distortions are introduced.
The solution to problem (22) gives the best that the EC policymaker can do
if the ECU is adopted. In this solution, tax distortions are smoothed optimal-
ly, but they cannot be eliminated. Thus, the solution to problem (22) is more
complicated than the solution to problem (21). We have not been able to say
much about the solution in general, so we computed numerical solutions for
particular parameter values. In the simulations reported in Table 3, we used
the log linear utility described in Proposition 1; we set ó-.OS and n(- nk)
- 1, and then we let g(- g~) vary between 0 and .2. In each case, we chose
the weíghts in the welfare function so that Italian and German utilities would
come out equal in the end, but the weights were always very close to one halfl3
The inflation tax is the same in both countríes. In the absence of any
offsetting tax, it distorts the relative price of cash and credit goods,
raising the price of cash goods above one when inflation is greater than -ó.
In Italy, the sales tax on credit goods, goes the other way, raising the price
of credit goods. In the simulations, we see that Italy always consumes more
cash goods than Germany, and less credit goods. When g is increased, and the21
tax distortions become bigger, these asymmetries in consumption patterns grow.
Consumption of trie foreign credit good aïways comes out somewhere in between;
the relative price of the foreign credit good also moves to smooth distortions.
The utilitíes of Italian and German households fall as g is increased, sínce
there is less output for the private sector to share when government consumes
more, and tax distortions are bigger when there is more spending to be financ-
ed. Or the othP- hand, we also know (from Proposition 1) that the util-~ies
decrease in the optimal two currency solution as valuation and currency
conversion costs are increased. In the last column in Table 3, we report the
critical values for these costs, the smallest values of c for which Italian and
German utilities are bigger in the ECU solution than in the two currency
solution. The critical values increase as g is íncreased. Higher levels of
government spendíng require more revenue, and higher tax rates imply bigger
distortions; tax smoothing is more important at high levels of government
spending. Our basic result is summarized in Proposition 2.
Pro~osition 2: If government spending is high in the EC, then separate curren-
cies should be maintained. If government spending is low, then
the EC may be an optimal currency area.
The only surprising result in Table 3 may be the low numbers obtained for
the critical values of c. Even if the government consumes as much as twenty
percent of output, valuation and currency conversion costs of less that two
tenths of one percent of the cost of producing an exported good make the EC an
optimal currency area. Thus we have:
Pro~osition 3: Very moderate valuation and currency conversion costs can make
the EC an optimal currency area.22
V. Limitations and Suggestíons for Future Research
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the Italian black economy is a
cash good, subject to a lira denominated cash in advance constraint. In
section III, this allowed the EC policymaker to tax the black market separate-
ly, using the Italian inflation tax. Alan Stoclanan has pointed out that there
is an obvious incentive here for black market participants to swítch to marks,
which are subject to a lower inflation tax; this possibility is simply ruled
out by the cash in advance constraints in our model. It would therefore be
interesting to replace our cash in advance constraints with a restríction that
allowed currency substitution. Would Stockman's concern constitute an argument
for currency controls? We do not know.
Throughout this paper, we have also assumed that policymakers can precommit
to monetary policies that may be time inconsístent. (The policies described in
section III do happen to be time consistent, since there are no distortions in
the equilibrium that results; this would not be the case if, say, a labor-
leisure decísion were added.) We noted in the introduction that the EMS is
sometimes justified on the grounds of credibility; Ital}~ is thought to be able
to solve its precommitment problem by tying the lira to the mark14 It would
therefore be interesting to drop our assumption about precommitment and
investigate time consistent solutionsls We speculate that Italy would once
again have the higher inflation rate. Italy may wish tie the lira to the mark
(if that is a viable option), even if it interferes with optimal tax smoothing.
In other words, credibílity may have to be weighed along with the valuation and
currency conversion costs when defining an optimal currency area.23
FOOTNOTES
1. Genberg (1988) provides an excellent discussion of this literature and
relates it to earlier work; however, he focuses almost exclusively on small
countries. Canzoneri and Gray (1985) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1988) extend
the discussion to large countries, using a game theoretic approach.
2. Here, we are following a research agenda suggested by Lucas (1986). Indeed,
a macroeconomic literature on ínternational tax policy is already developing;
see Kehoe (1987) and Frenkel and Razin (1988).
Mankiw (1987) reports some empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis
that US inflation has been used for intertemporal tax smoothing.
3. Some have tried to measure the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade
flows; see Bailey and Tavlas' (1988) recent summary of this literature. Few
have found these effects significant. However, exchange rate volatility would
not seem to be a good proxy for the concerns Mundell and others had in mind.
4. Of course, a seríous analysis of the EC would also have to ínclude the
stabilization and credibility factors.
5. This way of modeling black markets was suggested to us by Paul Wood in the
context of Latin American countries. Barro (1987) has also noted that the
inflation tax may be the only way of taxing the black economy.
6. See Lucas (1987) or Lucas and Stokey (1987) and the references therein for a
more detailed description of the framework outlined in this paragraph. We have
extended their structure to a two country setting.
7. Here we are applying Helpman and Razin' (1984) "buyer's system" to the
invoicing of credít goods. Some restriction on the use of currencies is
required if exchange rates are to be determinant; this is a reflection of the fact that there is no deep theory of currency substitution embodied in the cash in advance paradigm.
8. More precisely, T is in units of the Italian cash good; so, the mark value
of the credit for last period's transfer in the current financial exchange is
pt- T~et. Governments incur the same valuation and currency conversion costs
as ~he private sector; so, the total cost of the transfer is cp T~e in marks
or
c(pt-1T~etpt-1)(pt-l,p~t) - qt-1(pt-l~p~t) in units of the Gérman cash good.
9. Given our assumptions, there is no reason to consider nonstationary solu-
tions. Government spendíng is constant over time; so there is no need for
intertemporal tax smoothing. There would be issues of time consistency with
the monetary policies we consider, but we have assumed that policymakers are
precommitted to cooperative policies.
10. If governments were cash customers, instead of credit customers, the budget
constraints would be
g- B(y f qz) t h(x f g) and g~ - r~n~ f h~(x~ f g~),24
which are equivalent to (13).
Some governments try to increase the base for their seignorage tax by making
the private sector use domestic currency for government transactiens. In the
present framework, such efforts are pointless. If g is a cash good, the
seignorage revenue goes up by hg, but if g is bought on credit, payments are
inflated away by a factor ag - hg.
11. To verify (14), use the Italian government's budget constraínt to eliminate
B(y f qz) in the Italian household's budget constraint, and subtract the result
from the Italian resource constraint. Equivalent operations with the German
constraints give the German tra~e surplus, cz - q~z~ - q~T, which is equal to
the Italian deficit since q- c ~q~.
12. (14) implies T- 0, since z- z~ and since q- c.
13. For g- 0, w was .4995; for g-.1, w was .496; for g-.2, w was .493.
14. Canzoneri and Henderson (1988) question whether a credibility problem can
be so easily solved: why is an announcement about an exchange rate policy more
binding than an announcement about a money supply policy?
15. To do so, we would have to introduce a cost to actual (as opposed to
anticipated) inflation; see Grossman (1988) or Obstfeld (1988).25
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Table 1: The Importance of Seignorage~
Seignorage as a percent
of total government revenue: Inflation:





















Table 2: The Importance of the Black Economy
Percent of GNP in Italy Percent of GNP ín Germany
Source:
Kent Matthews~ 15 to 20 7 to 10
de Grazia (1984) 20 to 25 2
Contini (1982) 14 to 20 ---
Langfeldt (1983) --- S to 10
~Matthew's estímates, based on his reading of a number of studies, were given to us in private conversation.AII~~Í~~~NI~INI~Í1Ílllllllll